Introduction:
Recently, partly as a result of the continuing failure of Chris Sinckler as minister of finance and prime minister Freundel Stuart’s hesitance in removing him from office, questions have been raised about the constitutionality of a Cabinet reshuffle. It is a subject that will take up a considerable amount of time by constitutional experts such as lawyers, political ‘scientists’, parliamentary historians, legal philosophers and others. However, for a non-lawyer with a cursory interest in politics and in how the Westminster/Whitehall model has shaped Caribbean politics, I find the subject one of intrigue. One person who has added his highly informed, articulate and knowledgeable voice to the debate is Caswell Franklyn. Mr Franklyn has a wealth of knowledge about Barbadian Constitutional law and his suggestion, to paraphrase him, that before the prime minister could carry out a Cabinet reshuffle he must first make seek the approval of the Governor General, the Queen’s representative, raised a number of questions in my mind. I will not be so bold as to challenge Mr Franklyn about the constitutionality of a Cabinet reshuffle in the local jurisdiction, my contention, however, is that if parliamentary politics in Barbados have adopted the so-called Westminster/Whitehall model, then this is strange.
Analysis:
The controversy started because of the state of the economy and the government’s apparent inability to devise a rescue plan. In such circumstances attention obviously focuses on the incumbents in the high offices of state, principally the prime minister and minister of finance.
Nothing that Mr Sinckler has said or done in office has convinced anyone with above average knowledge about the economy that he is on top of the portfolio. This is reinforced by his lack of experience, according to his biographical details on the parliamentary website, although they are noticeably lacking in details. Further, Mr Sinckler was an appointment in unfortunate circumstances by the late prime minister David Thompson. However, prime minister Stuart was not morally or duty-bound to keep Mr Sinckler in office for the duration of the Thompson/Stuart term, nor indeed was there any compelling reason why the recent general election victory could not be used as an opportune moment to shift Mr Sinckler sideways. This, I suggest, is a failing of the prime minister’s.
On the substantive issue of the constitutionality of a reshuffle, under the Westminster rules, a reshuffle is the prime minister’s own responsibility and has nothing to do with the Sovereign. As primus inter pares, the right to reshuffle his/her Cabinet as s/he pleases is one of the few perks of the job a prime minister has. Of course, they can be disruptive to good government and administrative efficiency and should be carried out with enormous precautionary skills and awareness of their impact and destablising effect, but it is his/hers alone, unless the prime minister in any way wants to consult senior colleagues. Given that parliament does not have any formal scrutiny of Cabinet appointments, in the way, for example, the US Senate has or even the British House of Commons under the select committee system, the House of Assembly, the lower house, is often forced to accept any changes a prime minister may make.
As Lord Boateng of Akyem and Wembley, a British Labour peer with Barbadian connections, told a parliamentary committee of inquiry: “Reshuffles are the PM’s primary instrument in dealing with ‘events’, be they a crisis brought on by a ministerial indiscretion, death, illness, or catastrophic or lesser degrees of failure, or a means in troubled times of reasserting the PM’s authority and maintaining the balance of political forces. “They are seldom if ever simply about refreshing the ranks of the government with new and upcoming talent, rewarding outstanding parliamentary performance, and so on.” He goes on to add: “This exalted and high-minded explanation is often given but rarely in my view wholly truthfully. “The decisions made are necessarily highly subjective, not always entirely capable of being justified by reasoned explanation and in some instances are quite inexplicable.” In short, whatever the justification used, the prime minister has absolute power to change the make-up of his/her Cabinet whenever s/he chooses. In fact, the greatest post-war example of a radical reshuffle in British politics, which still remains the standard for Westminster-style Cabinet reshuffles, was that of Tory prime minister Harold Macmillan in 1962, the so-called Night of the Long Knives. In that political bloodbath, Mr Macmillan dismissed seven senior members of his Cabinet with the speed and precision of an assassin. The reason for such a radical move, in which the biggest casualty was Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of finance) Selwyn Lloyd, was the declining popularity of the government and a fear that voters were hostile to the government’s economic policies. Even now, re-reading the newspapers of 52 years ago, one gets a true feeling of the political tensions of the period. Lord Boateng continues: “Some reshuffles go better than others. Some are undoubtedly missed opportunities, particularly when heels are dug in by the pieces on the chequer board. “But, given the nature of prime ministerial and Cabinet government and the impact of events, in my view it’s not easy to see how if we continue to draw folk from the ranks of parliament, it might be readily reformed.” Therefore the prime minister, under our current system, unlike that of the US presidential system, cannot draw on unelected persons to hold high ministerial office. Ministers should be present in the lower house to answer to members, the elected representatives of the people.
As Ben Bradshaw, former Labour Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport told the same committee of inquiry in rejecting the right of parliament to interfere with ministerial appointments: “Prime ministers have to have the freedom to appoint and fire ministers for which they are ultimately responsible.
“Their freedom of movement is restrained enough by the need to balance their government politically and keep ‘big beasts’ happy…” And British-born Australian-based politics professor Keith Dowding, told the same committee: “ There is no evidence that high (Cabinet) turnover affects the delivery of policy. Ministers do not deliver policy; civil servants do.” He goes on: “The ability of the prime minister to shuffle at will (subject to political and practical constraints) enhances her authority. To have constitutional constraints on that ability would hamper both prime ministerial authority and parliamentary accountability.” He adds: “High ministerial turnover might have some deleterious effects on the capacity of the government and the civil service to produce and implement policy. “However, the disadvantages of taking away parliamentary and prime ministerial discretion to remove or shuffle ministers due to political or administrative contingencies would be far worse. “It should not be assumed that within the constraints with which they operate prime ministers are not trying to run an efficient government.”
Conclusion:
Cabinet reshuffles should remain the prime minister’s key instrument of managing government. And, if there is a constitutional brake on how s/he could best do this then the constitution is in effect impeding our parliamentary democracy. I suspect prime minister Stuart is aware of this and for obstinate and/or political reasons is refusing to move Mr Sinckler who is neither equipped through occupational experience (working for an NGO does not prepare one to be a finance minister), training (a post-graduate degree in trade only goes part of the way) or demonstrable capability (just look at his performance in office).
A failing minister left in office for too long becomes stale and runs out of ideas unless s/he has a particular passion and commitment to his/her portfolio – Cameron Tudor at education is a good local example. Of course, on assuming office, the prime minister – the person who the majority party elects as leader – presents him/herself to the Sovereign (governor general) to establish a claim to form the new government. But that act is one of assuming office as a government, not one of the Sovereign approving individual ministerial appointments. Although the ministerial Code states that it is a prerogative power of the prime minister to recommend to the Sovereign the appointment, dismissal and acceptance of resignation of ministers and to determine the membership of Cabinet and Cabinet committees….” it nevertheless goes on to say the prime minister is responsible for the overall organisation of the Executive and the allocation of functions between ministers in charge of departments.” Sir Jeremy Heywood, secretary of the Cabinet, told the committee of inquiry: “”..reshuffles of Cabinet are primarily political events, driven by the prime minister’s own views…..(D)uring a reshuffle, the Cabinet secretary may need to advise the prime minister on three broad areas: First, the number of ministers and the balance of Commons and Lords ministers….”, second, pressures on departments and third, likely conflicts of interests. No need to advise the PM to seek Sovereign approval.
In short, the recommendation to the Sovereign (in our case the governor general) is just functionary and there is no constitutional power to reject the prime minister’s recommendation. As Professor Dowding reminds us: “I see no need for the hiring and firing of ministers to be put on a statutory footing. There are no problems that emerge in the UK that do not exist in other countries. Parliament could be given a role in endorsing each ministerial appointment, but in a single-party government that would be largely ceremonial….”
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